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In the last 15 years, Bogotá went from being renown for corrupt governance and urban chaos to being a model for visionary politics and progressive urban planning. This article will analyze Bogotá’s turnaround and evaluate some of the main the the challenges that the city still faces, specifically considering the case of one of its largest and poorest areas, Ciudad Bolivar.. I will first introduce the demographic, economic
and political context of Bogotá. Secondly, I will present Ciudad
Bolivar and its informal urbanization. I will assess the opportunities
and challenges represented by the participatory model of planning and
policy-making adopted by the Colombian government in the last decade.
I will focus on the difficulties of engaging citizens in the democratic
process in economically depressed areas. Finally, I will suggest possible
ways of bridging the communication gap between the informal city and
political institutions. 1. The Context of Bogotá a. Demography Bogotá has experienced tremendous growth in the past century. Today, it is a thriving capital city of more than 7 million people, half of which are poor, according to the Department of City Planning. The city’s population has grown tremendously in the last decades as armed conflict intensified in the countryside forcing many Colombians to migrate to urban centers. b. Economy In the midst of Colombia’s ongoing armed conflict, which spans more than fifty years, Bogotá is the country’s main economic driver , along with the other major urban centers (Medellin, Barranquilla, Cali). Good urban governance has reduced corruption in the administrations, stabilized the economy, and encouraged foreign investment. The financial, industrial, communication and retail sectors provide a decent living for the part of the population employed in the formal sector. Colombia’s GDP growth was one of the highest in Latin America last year1. The economy of Bogota is not as bad as it could be given the national context. However, one of Bogotá’s main issues is economic disparity. More than half of the population works in the informal sector and about as many are poor.
c. Urban Governance Colombia adopted a new Constitution in 1990, which aimed at decentralizing political power and empowering the citizenry. The city’s mayor became an elected official (before 1990, city mayors were appointed by the president). In turn, the mayor of Bogotá appoints local mayors for each of the twenty localities of the city. Local mayoral offices receive their funding from the city, and exceptionally from the national government. More money is allocated to the localities with the highest share of the population living in absolute poverty.2 Constitutional reforms were necessary to legitimize democratic institutions, which had lost all credit in the eyes of the population. The Mayor of Bogotá would not longer be appointed by the president but be elected by the population. This considerably changed the profile of public officials in the city, reduced political patronage, and improved citizens perception of the political system. None of the recently elected Mayors belonged to one of the two major Colombian party, the Partido Liberal and the Partido Social Conservador. Elected in 1995 and then again in 2000, Antanas Mockus, used his charisma and political imagination to turn Bogotá into a ‘social experiment’. His policies largely contributed to cut the number of homicides from 80 to 22 per 100,000 inhabitants between 1993 and 2003. He is also credited with reducing corruption in public services and restoring people’s interest in public matters. Moreover, Antanas Mockus pursued the efforts engaged by his predecessor Jaime Castro to rationalize the city’s finances. He not only increased the city’s “investment” budget (as opposed to the opperational budget allocated to the city’s bureaucracy), but also left a big budgetary surplus allowing the next Mayor, Enrique Penalosa, to finance groundbreaking public projects such as the longest pedestrian walkway of the world and the Transmilenio bus system.3 Antanas Mockus is now preparing his presidential campaign. The current Mayor, Luis-Eduardo Garzon who is the first coming for the traditional Left, won the election running on an anti poverty agenda. This wave of visionary and independent mayors took Bogotá out of political chaos and away from partisan politics and patronage, at least partially. Decentralization and democratic empowerment restored some faith in political institutions. The political vacuum, particularly in the poorest neighborhoods of the city, had already had already given much ground to urban guerillas and criminal organizations to develop. The City of Bogotá is now actively trying to integrate the poorest population to the mainstream, at least on paper. 2. Ciudad Bolivar a. Demographics The development of informal settlements in Bogotá’s periphery largely results from the massive influx of rural immigrants. Many Colombians come to the city to escape rural violence. The search for economic opportunities in the city that is common to all developing countries is also an important driver of this migration. Too poor to afford housing rents, they have to find alternative solutions, such as building their own houses. The World Bank estimates that Bogotá has “over 1400 informal settlements occupying 24% of its area and housing 22% of its population.”4 Representing 10% of Bogotá’s population, Ciudad Bolivar is the locality, which grew the fastest in the last decades. Between 1993 and 2002, the population of Ciudad Bolivar grew by 50%, more than twice as much as the city as a whole5. Population grew from 35,000 residents in 1973 to a projected 713,000 in 20056. This data is probably a huge underestimation of the population of Ciudad Bolivar. By other accounts the population is somewhere between 1,2 million7 and 2 million. b. Social Conditions Ciudad Bolivar has by most indicators the worst social conditions in Bogotá. The government has not been able to keep pace with the area’s growing population in developing the necessary infrastructure systems. In 2002, it had the by far the lowest level of equipment in Bogotá. It also has the lowest level of green space per habitant (1,94m2), and the lowest number of police stations (1 per 100,000 habitants). The percentage of people with unsatisfied basic needs in Ciudad Bolivar has decreased since 1993, but it still represented more that a quarter of residents in 2001. Violence too is high: assaults were the first cause of death for people aged between 15 and 44 and the second for people aged between 45 and 598. c. Pirate Urbanization Most of the 400,000 houses in Ciudad Bolivar were built with very basic means, without plans or permits by the residents or by slumlords. A house in Ciudad Bolivar costs between $700,000 and 1 million pesos (USD $270 - $380). However, houses have limited potential as a financial asset since the market is for the most part stagnant. Incomers do not have the means to buy a house and the middle-class is not interested in living in the area. The majority of houses are owner-inhabited; only 37% of housing units are rented. A house often represents more than a shelter for residents. Owners typically rent part of their houses or use the ground floor for business. They can be used as workspaces for manufacturing, food, and other services. Expanding families can rarely afford to move into a bigger house; therefore they add floors to their houses, which causes all kinds of safety issues and increases density. The most populated neighborhood in Ciudad Bolivar, Lucero, has a density of 42,400 habitants per squared kilometer. The densest neighborhood in Ciudad Bolivar, San Francisco, has a density of 46,900 habitants per squared kilometer. In comparison, Tokyo has less than 20,000 habitants per squared kilometer and New York less than 10,0009. To compare with cities with approximately the same population as Ciudad Bolivar, in 2001 the density of Barcelona (Spain) was 14,910km2 (33,275 in the densest neighborhood, the Eixample10), and the density of San Diego (California) was 1,456/km2 in 2001. |
Top: map of Colombia from escolar.com. Middle: the localities of Bogota from geneslimited.com Bottom: Satelite view of Bogota from Spot image. In red is the rural land.Ciudad Bolivar is expending outside of the District of Bogota in the South of the city.
Top: View of Ciudad Bolivar
by Bernard
Lortic. Bottom: Ciudad Bolivar [urbanology]. |
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d. Public
Infrastructure In an effort to cut the cost of retrofitting informal settlements, the City created an agency called Metrovivienda. It acquires land at the edge of the city, puts in place the necessary infrastructure and then sells the lots to developers who build for sale affordable housing units. The principal weakness of this program is that it leaves out families too poor to buy a house. Families have to develop their own shelters in the most unwanted parts of the city, and often end up in areas not suited for construction because they present environmental hazards or geological instability. Particular efforts have been made to connect Ciudad Bolivar to the rest of the city through public transportation networks. The innovative Transmilenio system reaches the edge of the locality. Then, feeder buses bring people deeper inside the locality. The price of a ticket is $900 Colombian pesos (about USD $0.38). People who don’t live along Transmilenio’s trunk lines typically have to use at least two buses each way. This costs an average of $3,200 Colombian pesos a day (USD $1.40). Transportation costs are an important part of the budget for many families; the minimum wage in Colombia just rose to $381,500 CPO (USD $160). Many people earn even less than that, especially women, who are also often the head of the household. e. Urban Dynamics Ciudad Bolivar is filled with perfectly sane and loving families who are the first victims of the economic, social, and urban problems stigmatizing informal settlements. Most of Ciudad Bolivar is pretty far from the stereotypical perception of a “slum”. Many people are interacting in the streets, children playing and laughing, mothers walking home with grocery bags, men coming back from work in the city. There are even Internet cafés. Of course, some parts that are worst than others, but everywhere residents strive to improve their living conditions and consolidate their shelters. Poor neighborhoods, steaming out of the informal are dynamic places whose inhabitants desire nothing more than lifting themselves up out of poverty and integrating the mainstream. They are very different from the drug and crime ridden squatter settlement of Cartucho in the center of Bogotá, which was cleared up by the Penalosa administration in the late 1990s. f. Economic Dynamics The informal sector provides means of subsidence for half of the population of Bogotá13. It is the second best solution for people who are unable to integrate the formal sector, not a problem in itself. The problem is rather the inability of the formal sector to provide employment to the whole population. Most immigrants from the country have no choice but engaging in undeclared economic activities to survive. If the law was forcefully applied and people barred from economic alternatives, they would probably starve to death14. Moreover, the borderline between the formal and the informal sectors is blurry. For instance, many formal sector corporations hire informal labor, especially in construction or factory work. Other typical informal employments are informal commerce and housekeeping. Similarly, public money is often rerouted to the informal sector through intricate systems of organized corruption and political patronage. g. Culture & Communal Spaces Communal spaces and collective projects are essential to the wellbeing and development of the community. They are spaces where common objectives can be identified and pursued, and where a common identity and culture can be developed. Ciudad Bolivar is a young community made of immigrants from all parts of the country. Therefore developing and consolidating social ties and a felling of belonging and pride is extremely important. Many studies in developing countries “have quantified variables like density of associations, membership heterogeneity and degree of active participation. These demonstrated that households social capital improves their levels of wellbeing, welfare measured as income and market, health and education services access.”15 A notable civic initiative is the construction of a Maloka at the District College of Francisco de Bogotá in Ciudad Bolivar. A Maloka is a traditional indian of communal shelter. It was built by Huitoto Indians, an indigenous Colombian tribe. Indians tend to have a bad public image in Bogotá because they are often poor and transient. Many of the inhabitants of the Cartucho squatter settlement were Indians. In contrast, the Huitoto tribe preserved some of its ancient traditions, customs, and wisdom. Tribesmen inaugurated the Maloka with a ritual of purification and equilibrium. The Huitotos Indians use the center to share their knowledge and teach the youth the importance of speech, teamwork, and negotiation in the resolution of conflict. To professor Quinonez who was one of the main investigators of the Maloka, it is a place for dialogue where people can identify the issues and problem they are facing and propose alternatives. With this project, she says, “We wanted to rescue our own heroes and build a history told by its own protagonists.”16 This is a very good, if rare, example of a local project linking tradition, culture, social engagement, and integration. Ciudad Bolivar needs many more of these types of spaces of communication and exchange where the social fabric consolidates. In 2002, there were only 78 communal spaces in Ciudad Bolivar (less than one per 9,000 residents) and most of them were only available for rent. 3. Participatory Politics a. Progressive Reforms Since the constitutional reform of 1990, the Colombian political system encourages the participation of citizens in politics. However, the reality is not yet one of active citizenry. The terms of participation are not clear, political institutions are still mistrusted, and democratic culture lacking. In 2000, the government initiated Local Planning Councils (Consejos de Planeacion Local) in each locality. They are consultative instances on the formulation of local development plans. The councils are made of representatives of local organizations and social groups. They draw plans that define a shared and forward-looking strategic vision for the development of the locality. This plan orients the use of the Local Development Funds.17 The Plan for Economic, Social, and Urban Development for Bogotá 2004-2008 (Bogota Sin Indiferencia un Compromiso Social Contra la Pobreza y la Exclusión) includes political participation as one of its guiding principles. It aims at encouraging “the participation of citizens in the public decision-making and promote the strengthening of social organizations and the construction of social capital.” It stipulates that citizens should participate effectively in public decisions. “The district administration will provide the information, the scenarios, and the mechanisms necessary to the promote citizen participation and organization. The different actors, their interests and propositions will be recognized to insure that public decisions are the result of the making of agreements and consensus.”18 If anything, it is clear that there is a genuine will to engage citizens in the political process beyond electoral democracy. The very progressive Colombian political system recognizes that it can only be legitimized by integrating its constituency in its decision-making and also acknowledges that change must come from the very communities concerned. Unfortunately, beyond the rhetoric, participatory politics have not yet really materialized. b. Mistrust of Political Institutions The drive to encourage citizen participation is relatively new and Colombians are still largely mistrusting politics. In the word of a professor of the Universidad Nacional de Bogota: "The efforts are directed to mass media, not to the improvement of people’s lives. People’s buying power is diminishing every day. What about the unemployment rates which increase day by day? What about social policy? They close hospitals and schools because of insufficient resources but dedicate 70% of the National Budget to the Military. Moreover, there are more “desplazados” day by day, more massacres, more violence. What about the relationship between the Army and paramilitary forces? What about the connections between the mafia and the Government? What about stopping guerrillas when the war is actually a very good business? They don’t even use all of the money they receive for Plan Colombia to fight the guerrillas. I think that President Uribe has a double moral policy. Say one thing and do the other. Social control has increased even in big cities. People have no hope."19 On a practical level, the results are missing. For instance, the majority of citizens do not perceive local management as relevant. People who do intervene in the few public discussions organized by Local Planning Councils leave with the impression that their participation was not really desired. Moreover, the quality of public policies developed in the process of participatory planning is generally low. The technocrats reviewing and implementing the plans do not value the initiatives taken by citizens. This results in a drastic diminution of attendance to the meetings organized by local mayors. Only retired citizens still have the interest and time to attend most meetings.20 c. Developing Political Culture in Ciudad Bolivar Immigrants came for peace, running away from the political violence and armed conflict. Most of them have not had the time or peace of mind to start thinking about themselves as citizens and community members. Moreover many are still terrified by the armed groups that chased them away and maybe killed some of their relatives or neighbors. Engaging in the participatory process organized by the government, and thereby legitimizing it, can be perceived as a risk. Some might have affiliations with one or the other armed groups in conflict (guerrillas or paramilitaries) and see the government as an enemy. In a context of insecurity and deep precariousness, participation cannot really be expected; at least not within mainstream political institutions even though, the will to be politically represented exists: According to a report, 66% of the people registered to vote in Ciudad Bolivar participated in the 2002 presidential elections and 57% cast their vote in the local elections in 2000, which is more than the city average.21 Participation and collective decision making requires cultural change in a context were political conflict dominates. A lesson learned from a project developed in another poor neighborhood22 is that for “historical reasons, [the concept of participation] is hardly understood as a possibility of interaction that takes into account the conciliation of interests between the parties involved. While the mentality of the state can seem to be attacked by community participation, the communities tend to overvalue the virtues of participation turning it into a tool for imposing local interests. This change in mentality is in an intermediate state of development.”23 Communication channels are lacking at both ends of
the political spectrum. Citizens have a hard time communicating their
visions and aspirations to the State, which in turn has little mean to
reconnect itself to the citizenry. The State is very much perceived as
an exterior entity pursuing its own agenda often at the expense of the
weakest. Good feedback mechanisms and information systems would empower
the population. a. Feedback Mechanisms Residents usually know best what they need in terms of economic, social, and urban development. There has been a political will, albeit precarious, to engage residents in decision-making. Unfortunately, communication channels between residents and the City government are inexistent or very weak. A feedback system which would allow the residents of Ciudad Bolivar to make themselves heard, not only from public officials but also from the rest of the population is needed. Actual planning proposals should should stem from these local feedback. b. Como Vamos An interesting initiative is the “Bogotá, How are we doing” project (Bogotá, Como vamos). Its purpose is “to evaluate changes in the quality of life from the local inhabitants’ viewpoint by ‘socialization’ and provision of technical information thus enabling the evaluation of the public administration’s performance and the betterment of its impact.”24 The evaluation is based on thematic analysis, citizens’ perception surveys and workshops, seminars, debates with experts. The project’s results are published in Colombia’s main newspaper, ‘El Tiempo’, one of the principal initiators of the project, with “a record of 96.2% readers … To 78% of the people the information is relevant, to 74% the reports are credible.”25 Mayor Antanas Mockus drew the agenda for his second mandate on the basis of measurable goals. “Bogotá, How are we doing” thus constitutes an excellent tool to evaluate the work of elected officials. Now that an efficient mechanism for top-down transparency exists, bottom-up feedback mechanisms must be consolidated. c. Bottom-Up Communication Workshops and citizen meetings are time-consuming and not motivating. Those organized by local administration ended up being filled mostly with elderly people, who cannot by themselves represent the needs and aspirations of the whole population. Better feedback mechanisms have to be invented. I propose the establishment of small civic offices throughout the city. There should be at least one for every 500 residents and they should be easily accessible to everyone, including children. Each civic office would be equipped with a computer with high speed internet access and have a staff available for maintenance and technical support. The civic office could also serve as a communication center where people could post adds (job search, apartment rentals, furniture sale…). The computer terminal would be connected to a citywide intranet system destined to receive people’s opinions, ideas, and reactions at the level of the block, settlement, locality, city, and country. People would also be invited to answer surveys and to comment on planning proposals from the administration. The level of literacy being very high in Colombia, most people should have no problem writing their thoughts, but video recordings should be available for the youngest and the illiterates. That would be pretty similar to the very successful City-TV system that allows people in the street to record a video-message which gets diffused on the local TV network. The feedbacks would be categorized and then reviewed by the staff of the concerned administration and the relevant city level (locality, city, nation…). Of course, anyone could also review each others’ proposals and feedbacks. For matters of urban planning, interactive plans and maps could be displayed insuring that the residents concerned by new urban developments would have a clear visual idea of the proposals. Ideally a touch screen system would allow the residents to give feedbacks directly on the maps and plans, sketching new features or modifying the proposed developments. The computerized feedback system should go hand-in-hand with citizen meetings and workshops. Hopefully, the civic offices would contribute to give residents a better understanding of the planning opportunities and challenges, which could spark of more interest in actual public meetings. Conclusion Creative political thinking has allowed Bogotá to transform its faith. The extreme political tensions tearing apart the country have forced radical changes in the political system and made participatory urban and political planning inevitable. The poorest and most disconnected areas of the city need political integration the most. In Ciudad Bolivar for instance, disconnection from mainstream institutions opens the way to guerillas and urban violence. Moreover, meaningful planning in areas which have a history of self-helped development and informal economic activity can only be achieved from the bottom-up, with the support of the government. Bogotá is on the verge of becoming a model of participatory politics. Although it has not yet been very successful at realizing its intentions, the ingredients are there to make it one the world most progressive city. More than ever creativity and vision are needed to help bridge the gaps between the population and the government.
Footnotes 1 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Colombia,
December 2003 & CIA World Fact Book: Colombia, May 2003 References María Cristina Caballero, Academic turns city into a social experiment: Mayor Mockus of Bogotá and his spectacularly applied theory, Harvard University Gazette, March 11, 2004: http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/03.11/01-mockus.html Ciudad Bolivar, Mas Cerca de las Estrellas, La Expresion, Bogotá Colombia, http://www.laexpresion.com Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Colombia, December 2003 & CIA World Fact Book: Colombia, May 2003 Israel Fainboim, World Bank Report, Colombia Urban
Services Projects, Washington El Gobierno Distrital, Las Localidades, Ciudad Bolivar, Localidad 19, Bogota 2004, http://www.idct.gov.co/ Monografia De Ciudad, Alcaldia Mayor De Bogota, D.C. Departamento Administrativo De Planeacion Distrital 2003 Proyecto Bogotá Como Vamos, La Pobreza en Bogota, Bogota D.C. Agosto de 2003 UN Habitat, Best Practices, Bogotá, How are we doing, The Together Foundation and UNCHS, 2002 El Tiempo, En Ciudad Bolívar resuelven los problemas al estilo huitoto, Bogotá, January 18, 2004 Fabio E. Velasquez & Esperanza Gonzales, La Planeocion Participativa en Bogota D.C. Analisis y Propuestas, Fundacion Corona, Bogota, January 2004 Sandra Viviana Polania Reyes, Capital Social E Ingreso
de los Hogares del Sector Urban en Colombia, Resumen, Universidad de
Los Andes, Bogota, May 2004 Websites http://www.bondy.ird.fr/cvd/stagiaires/diop/bogota/FICHE_BOGOTA.html
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Top Photo: Water coverage is almost universal
in Bogota, although it is hard to keep in pace with the development of
informal settlements [urbanology].
Bottom Graph: Infrastructure for education, social wellbeing, health,
culture, religious activity. Ciudad Bolivar ranks
last. source: Alcadia
Mayor de Bogota, D.C. Department Administrativo
de Planeacion Distrital.
The drive to consolidate. Top: Ciudad Bolivar
by Carlos Torres. Middle: Work is always in process in Ciudad Bolivar.
Image by Gabriel
Castro. Bottom: Bogota Sud by Bernard
Lortic. Areas of high poverty, in red on the map. We can see that large parts of Ciudad Bolivar are in red. source: Rueda-Garcia, Understanding Slums: Case Studies for the Global Report 2003: Bogota, UN Habitat 2003.
Top: The Huitoto Maloka of the Colege of Francisco de Bogota.
Bottom: Exemple of a traditional Huitoto Maloka.
Top: Friends in Ciudad Bolivar by Gabriel
Castro. Middle: The police in Ciudad Bolivar controls a group of
young people at night, by Philippe
Revelli. Bottom: Culture of violence in Colombia: the government
sometimes just look another actor of the violence. |
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